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CHEMICAL COMPOUNDS RELATED AS GENUS
AND SPECIES AND THE PATENTABILITY
REQUIREMENT OF NOVELTY
I. INTRODUCTION
The patentability of chemical compounds related as genus! and spe-
cies2 presents a problem in deciding the proper scope of patent protection
granted to an inventor.3 Should the inventor of a genus be granted a patent
1. In chemistry "genus" means "a group of compounds closely related both in structure and in
properties." In re Kalm, 378 F.2d 959, 963 (C.C.P.A. 1967). Organic compounds can have the same
formula yet have entirely different properties and structures since organic compounds are three-di-
mensional and differences in three dimensions cannot be shown by a two-dimensional formula. G.
LEE, H. VAN ORDEN, & R. RAGSDALE, GENERAL AND ORGANIC CHEIISTRY 763 (1971). For example,
C2H6 0 is the formula for both ethyl alcohol and methyl ether, yet their properties and molecular
configurations are different, as shown below.
H H H H
I I I
H-C-C-OH H-C-O-C-H
I I I I
H H H H
ethyl alcohol methyl ether
Compounds which have the same formula, but different three-dimensional structures, are called
isomers. R. MORRISON & R. BOYD, ORGANIC CHEMISTRY 32 (2d ed. 1966). As can be seen from the
above example, ethyl alcohol and methyl ether are isomers. These compounds are not members of the
same genus or chemical family, whereas methyl alcohol (CH 40) and ethyl alcohol (CH 60), having
slightly different formulas but similar structure and properties, are both members of the same generic
family. That family is the lower molecular weight alcohols, represented by the general formula
C.H2.+20-
H H H
I I I
H- C-OH H-C-C-OH
I I I
H H H
methyl alcohol ethyl alcohol
2. "Species" refers to a particular chemical compound falling within a genus. The general for-
mula, CH +20 described in note 1 supra, includes the following straight chain, low molecular
weight alcohols:
methyl CH3OH
ethyl CH3CH2OH
n-propyl CH3CH2CHOH
R. MORRISON & R. BoYo, supra note 1, at 501. Each of these compounds is a species and has its own
properties and structure. Thus, n-propyl alcohol is a species within a genus of lower molecular weight
alcohols. A homologous series is one in which each compound differs from the preceding compound
by an identical chemical grouping (CH2 in the above example). Such compounds are called homo-
logs. Id. at 101. Each homologous series is characterized by a functional group defining the structure
of the family of compounds and largely determining its properties. Id. at 175. In the above example
the hydroxyl group (OH) is the main functional group.
3. 1 D. CiusuM, PArrNs § 3.04[l][c] (1979).
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covering all of the often numerous compounds which the genus might in-
clude? Should disclosure of the genus automatically eliminate a later
inventor's ability to patent individual members of the genus, or should a
court consider genus size and similarity of structure and properties in de-
ciding patentability of the individual species? 4 The Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals has examined some of these issues. 5 This comment will
discuss and synthesize its decisions.
II. BACKGROUND
The granting of patents is constitutionally based 6 and has been pro-
vided for by statute since 1790.7 An inventor is entitled to a patent if the
claimed invention falls within statutorily defined subject matter8 and can
meet other requirements of utility, 9 novelty,' 0 and nonobviousness. I In
4. This comment is concerned with the situation in which the genus has previously been dis-
closed and the subsequent claim is for a species within that genus. For example. if "fluids" were the
previously disclosed genus, would the species "milk" be patentable?
5. See In re Schaumann, 572 F.2d 312 (C.C.P.A. 1978): In re Wiggins. 488 F 2d 538
(C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Arkley, 455 F.2d 586 (C.C.P.A. 1972): In re Ruschig. 343 F.2d 965
(C.C.P.A. 1965); In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676 (C.C.P.A. 1962): In re Baranauckas. 228 F.2d 413
(C.C.P.A. 1955).
6. The United States Constitution provides Congress with the power "[tlo promote the Progress
of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. 1. § 8. cl. 8.
7. The Patent Act of 1790 granted the inventor of a "sufficiently useful and important" device the
sole right to manufacture or sell that device for up to 14 years. Act of Apr. 10, 1790. ch. 7. § I. 1
Stat. 109, 110. The Patent Act of 1793 added the requirement that a patentable discovery be "new."
Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318, 319. The United States Supreme Court in Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood, 52 U.S. (II How.) 248 (1851). defined "new" in such a way that a third test of patenta-
bility was established. To be patentable an invention had to evidence skill and ingenuity beyond that
possessed by an ordinary mechanic skilled in the art. Id. at 267. This test remained outside the statu-
tory scheme and was subject to varying judicial construction until it was incorporated by the Patent
Act of 1952 as the requirement of nonobviousness. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
8. The Patent Act of 1952 provides: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process.
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof. may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101
(1976). For an elaboration of eligible subject matter, see I D. CHIsus PATENTS ch. 1 (1979).
9. The Patent Act requires that a machine, manufacture, process or composition of matter or
improvement thereon be useful. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). For a general discussion of the utility re-
quirement, see 1 D. CHISUM, PATENTS ch. 4 (1979). To obtain a patent on a chemical compound or
process, the applicant must disclose a practical use for the compound produced. Brenner v. Manson.
383 U.S. 519 (1966) (refusing patent for novel process for production of steroid because there was no
known usefulness for the compound produced).
10. The Patent Act provides:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a
printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for
patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign coun-
Genus and Species Patentability
chemical patents it is well settled that novelty is lacking, and a genus is
thus unpatentable, when at least one species within the genus has already
been disclosed 12 in the prior art. 13 A genus is said to be anticipated 14 by
try or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the applica-
tion for patent in the United States, or
(c) he has abandoned the invention, or
(d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented, or was the subject of an inven-
tor's certificate, by the applicant or his legal representatives or assigns in a foreign country prior
to the date of the application for patent in this country on an application for patent or inventor's
certificate filed more than twelve months before the filing of the application in the United
States, or
(e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an application for patent by another
filed in the United States before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or on an inter-
national application by another who has fulfilled the requirements of paragraphs (1). (2), and
(4) of section 37 1(c) of this title before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented, or
(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in this country by an-
other who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In determining priority of invention
there shall be considered not only the respective dates of conception and reduction to practice of
the invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to
reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception by the other.
35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
For a general discussion of novelty, see I D. CHisuM, PATEmS ch. 3 (1979).
11. Section 103 of the Patent Act provides:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as
set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at
the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was
made.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). The nonobviousness requirement is discussed in 2 D. CHIsuM, PATENTs ch. 5
(1979); Note, Standards of Obviousness and the Patentability of Chemical Compounds, 87 HARV. L.
Rav. 607 (1974).
12. In re Steenbock, 83 F.2d 912 (C.C.P.A. 1936). In considering an applicant's subsequent
claim for an invention relating to a process for treating fungus material (a generic class that includes
yeast) to render it antirachitically activated, the court stated: "The principle is well established in
chemical cases, and in cases involving compositions of matter, that the disclosure of a species in a
cited reference is sufficient to prevent a later applicant from obtaining generic claims. ... Id. at
913. This rule is not restricted to chemical genus-species patents, but is applied in other areas as well.
E.g., In re Slayter, 276 F.2d 408 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (genus of polyphase materials anticipated a subse-
quent species disclosure of a reinforced glass formed by incorporating short metal filaments in a glass
matrix).
13. "Prior art" is the fund of information which is in the public domain. Much of the information
comes from patent disclosures and publications, but other sources of information exist. See generally
D. Chisum, Sources of Prior Art in Patent Law, 52 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1976).
14. "Anticipation" means the disclosure in the prior art of a thing substantially identical to the
claimed invention. A. DELaaa, WALKER ON PATENTS § 57 (2d ed. 1964). When the 'prior art anticipates,
an invention is said to lack novelty. To constitute an anticipation, the prior art disclosure must be
sufficiently clear and exact to enable those skilled in the art to make and use the claimed invention.
Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (II Wall.) 516 (1871).
It is important to note that a claim-precluding disclosure under § 102 of the Patent Act
(anticipation) is distinct from a claim-supporting disclosure under § 112. Section 112 requires:
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its species. However, patentability is less clear in the reverse situation-
when a species claim comes after disclosure of its genus. In that situation,
the prior generic disclosure may be speculative rather than based on ac-
tual invention. 15 Such speculative patents were possible under early
decisions which held that a reference naming a compound or identifying it
by structural formula was adequate disclosure to anticipate a later claim to
that compound. 16 A more recent holding, however, requires an operative
method of synthesis in addition to the mere compound name or structural
formula. 17 While the anticipatory scope of a generic disclosure has not
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make
and use the same ....
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976). A patent application may sufficiently disclose an invention for the purpose
of § 102, yet be inadequate for the purpose of § 112. In re Steenbock, 83 F.2d 912. 913 (C.C.P.A.
1936). The "description of a single embodiment of broadly claimed subject matter constitutes a de-
scription of the invention for anticipation purposes .... whereas the same information in a specifica-
tion might not alone be enough to provide a description of that invention for purposes of adequate
disclosure [for claim support]." In re Lukach, 442 F.2d 967, 970 (C.C.P.A. 1971). However.
enumeration of each or of a plurality of constituent species is not necessarily required to support the
genus claim if the genus is sufficiently described by other appropriate language. In re Dreshfield. I 10
F.2d 235, 240 (C.C.P.A. 1940). The number of appropriate specific examples depends on the nature
of the genus. "In cases involving unpredictable factors, such as most chemical reactions and physio-
logical activity, the scope of enablement [claim-supporting disclosure] obviously varies inversely
with the degree of unpredictability of the factors involved." In re Fisher. 427 F.2d 833. 839
(C.C.P.A. 1970). The sufficiency of a disclosure depends not on the number but on the nature of the
claimed compounds and the supporting disclosures. If a patent claim covers closely related com-
pounds, a comparatively limited disclosure may be sufficient to support it, whereas more extensive
support may be necessary if the claim covers compounds related only in some structural aspects. I re
Surrey, 370 F.2d 349 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
15. Once some members of a family have been identified and their properties established, it is
possible to speculate on the existence of other members of the same family. The formula of the specu-
lative compounds can be calculated by extending the family's general formula, and. while it is impos-
sible accurately to predict all of a homolog's properties, its probable three-dimensional structure.
boiling point, vapor pressure, and other basic chemical characteristics are often predictable from the
properties of previously identified family members. See R. MORRISON & R. BOYD, supra note I, at
12-14.
16. E.g., In re Von Bramer, 127 F.2d 149 (C.C.P.A. 1942). In Von Bramer the appellant
argued that a "chemical product can be described in but two ways (1) by reciting a sufficient number
of its physical and chemical attributes ... or (2) 'to recite a process which will unquestionably pro-
duce the substance.' " Id. at 152. The court disagreed, saying that having been labeled according to a
standard system of chemical nomenclature, the name of a compound alone will predict, based on
properties of similar compounds in its class, what the compound's properties will be like. The court
found it unnecessary to disclose an operative process for synthesizing the product.
17. In re Brown, 329 F.2d 1006 (C.C.P.A. 1964). In Brown a prior publication disclosed certain
elastomeric compositions comprising an organosilicon elastomer, a filler, and an organic peroxide
vulcanizing agent. The publication stated that attempts to prepare fluorine-containing silicone homo-
polymers had been unsuccessful. Subsequently, an applicant claimed a specific fluorine-containing
silicone homopolymer and the court allowed the claim, finding that the previous publication did not
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been defined, the court has expressed unwillingness to allow overly broad
genus disclosures to anticipate later species claims. ' 8 This comment will
focus on the acceptable degree to which a generic disclosure should be
held to anticipate its constituent species.
III. DISCUSSION OF CASES
The adequacy of a generic disclosure for anticipation was considered
by the court in In re Baranauckas. 19 In that case the Patent Office rejected
an applicant's claims for certain chlorine compounds because of a prior
art reference. 20 Throughout its description this reference used the term-
"halogen," designating a family of chemical elements which includes
chlorine.21 The court found this disclosure sufficient to identify and antic-
ipate the applicant's later claimed chlorine compounds. 22 The explicit
naming of each halogen compound was unnecessary. 23
The adequacy of a generic description for anticipation was next before
the court in In re Petering.24 There the prior art revealed a generic for-
mula which represented a group of isoalloxazines and a method of pro-
ducing them.25 The prior art reference described compounds capable of
influencing growth. The applicant's subsequent claims for certain of the
isoalloxazines which prevented growth were denied as anticipated. The
court found the prior art generic description to be inadequate, by itself, to
anticipate since it lacked a method of preparation for the compound in issue and failed to place the
homopolymer in the possession of the public. Id. at 1011.
18. In re Baranauckas, 228 F.2d 413 (C.C.P.A. 1955). The Baranauckas opinion concluded
with a strong warning that while the precise boundary lines are not presently discemable "they do not
extend so far as to permit publication of theoretical lists of hundreds or thousands of possible com-
pounds to deny patent protection on such compounds to those who actually discovered them later.
The exact boundaries . . . [are] to be delineated on a case by case basis." Id. at416.
19. 228 F.2d 413 (C.C.P.A. 1955).
20. Id. at 414-16. The Patent Office's section 102 rejection was premised on a publication
disclosing a method of producing hexabromocyclopentadiene. The method involved a number of
steps including the production of 1, 2, 3, 4-tetrabromocyclopentadiene-I, 3, as an intermediate.
The structural formula for this intermediate was disclosed in the publication and was nearly identical
to the applicant's later claimed chlorine compounds, 1, 2, 3, 4-tetrachlorocyclopentadiene--l, 3,
the difference being the substitution of bromine for chlorine.
21. Other members of the halogen family include bromine, fluorine, iodine, and astatine. G.
LEE, H. VAN ORDEN, & R. RAGSDALE, supra note 1, at 321-23.
22. The prior art specifically showed the structural formula of 1, 2, 3, 4-tetrabromocyclopenta-
diene-l, 3. and elsewhere in the reference the inventor referred to the generic class "halogens." The
court found that this reference to "halogens" indicated that the inventor perceived all halogens per-
forming like bromine, the specific bromine compound being given merely as an example of the possi-
ble halogen compounds. 228 F.2d at 415.
23. Id. at 416.
24. 301 F.2d 676 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
25. Id. at 681.
Washington Law Review Vol. 54:815, 1979
anticipate. 26 The prior art, however, disclosed preferences for the
variables in the generic formula,27 and in combination the generic for-
mula and narrowing language described a limited class of compounds. 28
This class was sufficiently limited to anticipate the applicant's later
claimed compounds.
The court in In re Ruschig29 further explained the Petering decision. In
Ruschig the species claimed were compounds used in the control of dia-
betes. 30 The Patent Office rejected the claims, citing the disclosures of
two earlier patents. 3' The court, however, reversed the rejection. A
"small limited class" like that in Petering was lacking in the earlier pat-
ents. 32 The classes were too large 33 and diverse to anticipate. 34
Similarly, in In re Arkley 35 the court found a generic description inade-
quate to anticipate. The claimed invention was an antibiotic 36 which the
Patent Office rejected as anticipated by an earlier patent. 37 That patent
disclosed a generic formula which encompassed over 230,000 com-
pounds38 and described a variety of substituents for the variables in the
formula. Through a series of selected substitutions in precisely the proper
combination, the disclosure could lead to the precursors 39 of the claimed
compounds. The court, however, found this description to necessitate too
26. Id. An infinite number of resulting compounds was possible because there was no express
limit on the number of alternative substituents for two of the variables.
27. Id.
28. The class described consisted of 20 compounds. excluding isomers. Id. See note I supra
(explanation of isomers). In Petering the court acknowledged that isomerism would increase the
number of compounds in the limited class, but found this fact immaterial because one with ordinary
skill in the art would be aware of those species which involve standard, well-known isomerism. Id. at
682.
29. 343 F.2d 965 (C.C.P.A. 1965). In a sequel case the Patent Office challenged the patentabil-
ity of one of the claims on a different statutory basis. In re Ruschig. 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
That case is of no importance here, however, since it concerned a § 112 rejection (claim-supporting)
rather than a § 102 rejection (claim-precluding). See note 14 supra.
30. The later claimed compounds were sulfonylureas. They were oral medications that could be
used to treat diabetes, replacing daily injections of insulin. 343 F.2d at 966.
31. Id. at 971.
32. Id. at 973-74.
33. The classes consisted of 130 and 156 compounds. Id. at 974.
34. The possible substituents were not closely related compounds as in Petering. Id.
35. 455 F.2d 586 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
36. The invention was a broad spectrum antibiotic of the cephalosporin Cx-type. Id.
37. Id. at 586-87.
38. "Appellants [the later applicants] 'conservatively' estimate that over 230.000 compounds
(including, concededly, theirs) are embraced within this generic disclosure .... ." Id. at 587. The
Patent Office conceded that " '[i]f this were the only anticipatory disclosure in the reference.' the
disclosure would be 'too diffuse' to support a § 102 rejection." Id.
39. A precursor is a substance from which another substance is derived.
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much picking and choosing to arrive at the claimed compounds. 40 The
reference did not give adequate direction for making the proper selections
to justify an anticipation because the proper "blaze marks" 41 were
wanting.
In re Wiggins42 allowed the court to reaffirm the requirement of dis-
closing a method of preparation along with a compound name. 43 The ap-
plicants invented compounds useful for the treatment of Parkinson's dis-
ease. The Patent Office rejected the claims as anticipated by prior
disclosures. 44 The disclosing publication named two of the later claimed
compounds, but failed to provide an operative method of synthesis. 45 The
court, reversing the Patent Office, found that the mere naming of a com-
pound was inadequate to constitute anticipation. 46 A different conclusion
would allow lists of theoretically possible compounds to be generated
speculatively and published, thus barring the actual synthesizer of the
named compounds from subsequently patenting them. The court noted,
however, that a reference which merely names a compound is not entirely
without effect.47 Such a reference may be considered in examining other
statutory requirements.48
40. 455 F.2d at 588. Judge Baldwin stated in his concurring opinion:
The difficulty is that Flynn [the prior art reference] gives 38 or so possible precursors and 15 or
so tertiary amines which will react with those precursors to form CA-type compounds [such as
that claimed in the later patent application]. The Flynn disclosure, considered as a whole, does
not sufficiently direct one skilled in the art to the claimed compound.
Id. at 591. To duplicate the later claimed compound, the correct precursor must be selected (out of
38 possibilities), and that selection must coincide with the correct reactant being selected (out of 15
possibilities). The possible combinations number in the thousands. Thus. the likelihood of making
the two proper selections at the same time is very small unless further directions are given.
41. In In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967). the court, in discussing the selection of
variables, noted the old custom of marking trails in the woods by making blaze marks on the trees:
It is no help in finding a trail or in finding one's way through the woods where the trails have
disappeared-or have not yet been made, which is more the case here-to be confronted sim-
ply by a large number of unmarked trees .... We are looking for blaze marks which single out
particular trees.
Id. at 995.
42. 488 F.2d 538 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
43. See note 17 supra. In Wiggins, the methods of preparation of the claimed compounds were
disclosed by the applicant or were well-known in the art.
44. 488 F.2d at 542.
45. Id.
46. The court said that the prior reference's "listing of the compounds by name constituted noth-
ing more than speculation about their potential or theoretical existence. The mere naming of a com-
pound in a reference without more, cannot constitute a description of the compound . Id. at
543.
47. Id.
48. The reference may be useful in examining the § 103 nonobviousness requirement. Id. See
note 11 supra (discussion of the nonobviousness requirement). The prior art reference may be
combined with other relevant references in a § 103 examination.
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Most recently, genus-species patentability was before the court in In re
Schaumann.49 In Schaumann the applicant's claimed compound 50 was an
effective agent for increasing peripheral blood pressure in mammals with-
out causing a significant increase in pulmonary circulation pressure or
bradycardia. 5 1 A prior patent disclosed a generic formula which encom-
passed 105 compounds including the claimed compound. 52 Additionally,
the prior patent revealed both a method of synthesis and a preference for
certain substituents which operated to reduce the number of possible com-
pounds to seven. 53 Consistent with the holdings in Petering 54 and Rus-
chig,55 the Schaumann court found the limited class adequately
descriptive to anticipate the applicant's compound.
49. 572 F.2d 312 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
50. The applicant's claim was for a compound designated DL-1-(3-hydroxyphenyl)-2-ethyl-
aminopropane (HEP). The structural formula of the claimed compound was:
HO -j- -CH-CH,
H/\CRC
H H CH,
51. Bradycardia is an abnormal slowness of the heart beat. B. MALoY. THI, SiIri-iiw MH-[r)-\tI
DICTIONARY FOR LAWYERS 114 (3d ed. 1960).
52. The patent disclosed a class of (meta-hydroxyphenyl)-isopropylamines of the general for-
mula:
HO-CH,-CH,-CH-CH,
N
R R
'R designates hydrogen, an alkyl radical, for example methyl, ethyl. propyl. isopropyl. butyl. iso-
butyl, isoamyl, etc. or a cycloalkyl radical, for example cyclohexyl. ortho-. meta- or para-methyl-
cyclohexyl, tetrahydronaphthyl, decahydronaphthyl, etc.' "' 572 F.2d at 313 (quoting Patent No.
2,344,356 (1944)). When one R in the general formula designates hydrogen (H) and the other R
designates an ethyl radical (-CH,CH3), the resultant compound is HEP. the same compound claimed
by the later applicant. For a comparison, see note 50 supra: any difference is merely one of nomen-
clature. The applicant named the claimed compound (HEP) as a propane derivative using Arabic
numerals to denote substituent positions, whereas the prior art inventor termed the compounds as
amine derivatives using letters of the Greek alphabet to specify substituent positions. A prior patent
anticipates and renders invalid a subsequent patent for the same invention. Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gor-
mully Mfg. Co., 144 U.S. 238 (1892). See note 14 supra (explanation of the doctrine of anticipa-
tion).
53. 572 F.2d at 314.
54. 301 F.2d 676 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
55. 343 F.2d 965 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
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IV. ANALYSIS
The basic objectives of the patent system are to encourage invention of
useful devices, protect investments required to produce innovation, and
encourage the prompt disclosure of inventions. 56 Before an inventor is
rewarded 57 with a patent's private monopoly, he must give the public its
quid pro quo, the discovery and disclosure of an invention which in-
creases public knowledge. 58
Disclosure of the invention theoretically will encourage activity by
other inventors and make possible additional advances in the art.59 If the
first inventor is granted a patent with broad scope, however, the incentive
remaining for subsequent inventors is diminished. 60 In the area of chemi-
cal patents, the courts must balance the protection deserved by the inven-
tor of a genus61 with the protection desirable for later inventors who dis-
cover individual species within the genus. 62 Thus, the court is faced with
a dilemma: if it undermines- the original patentee's monopoly, investment
in research and public disclosure will be discouraged, whereas, if it does
not reserve incentive for later inventors, improvements in the state of the
art will be impaired.
56. 1 D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 3.01 (1979). See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-12
(1966).
57. One who invests labor and time in developing a new product should have the benefit of her
invention by being given the right to exclude others completely from the use of her invention. West-
em Elec. Co. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 546, 549 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
58. In re Tenney, 254 F.2d 619, 624 (C.C.P.A. 1958).
59. In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). the Court stated:
When a patent is granted and the information contained in it is circulated to the general public
and those especially skilled in the trade, such additions to the general store of knowledge are of
such importance to the public weal that the Federal Government is willing to pay the high price
of 17 years of exclusive use for its disclosure, which disclosure, it is assumed, will stimulate
ideas and the eventual development of further significant advances in the art.
Id. at 481. Patents should be granted to later inventors of nonobvious improvements; "encouragment
of improvements on prior inventions is a major contribution of the patent system and the vast major-
ity of patents are issued on improvements." In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
60. Incentive is diminished because a situation of blocking patents arises. Subsequent (improve-
ment) inventors are precluded from using the basic invention without permission; thus, they cannot
make, use, or sell their improvements without cooperation of the first inventor.
61. Limiting the inventor to claims involving the specific materials disclosed in the examples is
not adequate protection. A later inventor could avoid infringing the claims by following the
disclosure of the prior patent and merely substituting where appropriate. See In re Goffe, 542 F.2d
564, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
62. Using the example of fluids (genus) and milk (species), discussed in note 4 supra, if the
species patent were precluded by the earlier broad generic disclosure, the public would be deprived
of the benefit of additional information about milk. See notes 1-2 supra (definitions of "genus" and
"species"). On the other hand, if the first inventor does not receive adequate protection he will not
make the original disclosure, instead relying on the protection afforded trade secrets. See generally
R. MIL RIM, TRADE SECRETS ch. 2 (1978).
823
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The court's attempts to balance these interests in the genus-species
patentability area have provided some guidance in identifying the factors
that are determinative of an adequate generic description for purposes of
anticipation. The most important factor influencing the court is the size of
the generic class disclosed in the prior art reference. This factor is consid-
ered in most of the genus-species anticipation cases; 63 if the size is too
large the court is unwilling to find an anticipation. 64 In some instances,
however, the court has allowed an otherwise overly broad generic class to
be narrowed by limiting language found in the reference to give it an an-
ticipation effect. 65
The court has given only a limited indication of the acceptable maxi-
mum size of a genus. In Petering66 and Schaunann67 the genera were
sufficiently described to support anticipation, and in each instance the
genus was limited to encompass twenty or fewer compounds. 68 Prior to
limitation by the court, the genus involved in Schaunann69 contained a
size which both the court, and apparently the Patent Office, 70 found ex-
cessive. In Ruschig7' and Arkley 72 the court found generic classes of 130.
156, and a class numbering in the thousands, all inadequate to anticipate.
While it is difficult to generalize from so few cases, the court appears
to find anticipation where the numbers of compounds encompassed by the
63. See, e.g., notes 26, 28, 33, 38, 40, & 52 supra. and the sources cited therein, which indi-
cate the court's interest in the resulting size of the generic class.
64. In an anticipation inquiry the court is only passing on the claim-precluding adequacy of the
prior disclosure. The validity of the prior patent is not at issue.
65. For example, in In re Petering. 301 F.2d 676 (C.C.P.A. 1962). the generic formula taught
by the prior art reference "encompasse[d] a vast number and perhaps even an infinite number of
compounds." Id. at 681. The Petering court found this broad generic disclosure inadequate to antici-
pate a later claimed species. The prior reference, however, contained additional language which dis-
closed specific preferences for certain variable substituents in the generic formula. After examining
the recited pattern of preferences, the court concluded that a more limited class, consisting of 20
compounds, was carved out from the broad generic group. The generic formula, coupled with the
limiting language of the disclosure, was adequate to anticipate: expressly naming or structurally de-
signating every compound in the more limited class was unnecessary. Id. at 681-82.
The same procedure was followed in In re Schaumann, 572 F.2d 312 (C.C.P.A. 1978). in which
a genus with 105 compounds was narrowed to one containing only seven compounds by noting the
method of synthesis and taking into account preferences for certain substituents. Id. at 314.
66. 301 F.2d 676 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
67. 572 F.2d 312 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
68. Schaumann arrived at a limited class of seven compounds and Petering carved out a class of
about 20 compounds. 572 F.2d at 315; 301 F.2d at 681.
69. 572 F.2d 312, 314 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
70. Appellants argued that the general formula of the prior reference could not anticipate each of
the 105 or more compounds encompassed thereby. The patent examiner appears to have agreed with
that argument, as he felt compelled to point out that the prior reference contained additional informa-
tion further limiting the general formula. Id.
71. 343 F.2d 965 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
72. 455 F.2d 586 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
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prior art genus are such that an inventor might reasonably be expected to
have known of each of them. When the number reaches the hundreds it
becomes less likely the inventor knew of each individual compound and
more probable that he was merely speculating as to their existence.
In Petering, Ruschig, and Schaumann, the court discussed a second
factor important in determining the adequacy of a generic disclosure-the
similarity of structures and properties among members of the genus. In
Schaumann the court distinguished Petering from Ruschig by noting that
it was not merely the small size of the class that was determinative in
Petering; the similarity in structure and properties was also decisive.
73
This criterion is closely related to the requirement of a limited class size,
since, by nature, the smaller the genus the more similar the properties of
the constituent compounds. 74 This approach would eliminate judicial val-
idation of long lists of speculative compounds.
75
A third important factor in determining the adequacy of generic disclo-
sure for anticipation is the need to disclose an operative method of prepa-
ration. 76 A method of synthesizing the claimed compounds must either be
available from the original reference or be within public knowledge.
77
Merely naming compounds without a method of preparation is inadequate
to anticipate. 78
A further underlying consideration may influence the court when the
later claimed compound is thought to be especially beneficial to man-
kind. In such situations, the court appears tempted to find a lack of antici-
pation because of a strong desire to reward the later inventor;79 a contrary
result would truncate the species patentability investigation.
80
73. 572 F.2d at 316.
74. For an example, see R. MORRISON & R. BOYD, supra note 1, at 501, which shows the in-
creasing change in the physical properties of alcohols as the genus size is enlarged.
75. As early as In re Baranauckas, 288 F.2d 413 (C.C.P.A. 1955), the court warned against
creating lists of speculative compounds. See note 18 supra.
76. In re Wiggins, 488 F.2d 538 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
77. Id.
78. The court said that if it "were to hold otherwise, lists of thousands of theoretically possible
compounds could be generated and published which ... would bar a patent to the actual discoverer
of a named compound no matter how beneficial to mankind it might be." Id. at 543.
79. Wiggins involved compounds for treating Parkinson's disease. See text accompanying notes
43-46 supra. The prior reference revealed no information about the compound other than its name,
whereas the later species claim revealed the compound's effectiveness in treating Parkinson's dis-
ease. In re Wiggins, 488 F.2d 538 (C.C.P.A. 1973). The Ruschig invention was a medication for
the oral treatment of diabetes. See note 30 supra and text accompanying notes 30-33 supra. An
antibiotic was the invention in issue in Arkley. See note 36 supra and text accompanying notes
35-41 supra.
80. Evidence of unusual properties and unexpected benefits is not relevant in a § 102 anticipa-
tion test. Such evidence would be relevant, however, in a § 103 nonobviousness test. The court may
want the opportunity to hear and weigh these factors before deciding patentability in a close novelty
case.
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V. CONCLUSION
The court has long cautioned against creating speculative lists of gen-
eric compounds that exist only in theory yet preclude patentability by the
later, actual inventor. Thus, the requirements for adequate disclosure
have gradually stiffened. The court currently appears willing to find a
generic disclosure adequate to anticipate subsequent species inventions if
the number of compounds encompassed in the prior reference is limited to
approximately twenty. More numerous classes run the risk of being
overly broad. Compounds must also be similar in structure and proper-
ties, and a method of preparation must be described or well-known.
The court's insistence on a small, closely related genus seems appro-
priate in light of the objectives of the patent system. By allowing only the
well-described part of the genus to be anticipated, incentive remains for
later inventors, and innovation and improvement are encouraged. If the
first inventor desires more protection he has an alternative. He can pro-
vide more detail about genus members and list more illustrative
compounds. If the court allows theoretical lists or broad genus disclosures
to anticipate later species claims, society might be deprived of the ad-
vancements and improvements which might flow from further disclosure.
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